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Abstract - Nudges—subtle, covert, and often unobtrusive interventions that take 
advantage of individuals’ mental shortcuts and biases—frequently change the 
context of people’s choices and in so doing influence individual and societal 
behavior. They have become fashionable in recent years, and the ability of such 
phenomena to bring about significant change for relatively little cost has captured 
the imagination of governments and businesses. One simple yet potent nudge 
empowered by the status-quo bias that has received increased attention involves 
default rules which specify the condition imposed on persons when they fail to make 
a decision or choice. Marketers have used default options successfully for decades 
within the context of negative option marketing where sellers interpret consumers’ 
silence or inaction as permission to continue charging them for goods or services. 
Despite their attractiveness, nudges, defaults, and negative option marketing are 
controversial issues that require further examination which the authors present in 
this paper. 
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Introduction 
The concept of ‘nudging’ was popularized by behavioral economist Richard H. 
Thaler and law scholar Cass R. Sunstein in their 2008 book “Nudge: Improving 
decisions about health, wealth, and happiness.”  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest 
that public policy-makers and other individuals called choice architects (persons 
who organize and structure the way choices are presented) influence decision-
making processes in a manner that promotes behavior which is in the interest of 
society as well as the well-being of the decision maker.  They argue that public 
policy-makers can influence the daily behaviors of citizens by simply modifying the 
context.  For example, choice architects who place candidates first on a ballot win 
office between 4-5% more often than expected (Meredith & Salant, 2013). 
  Since the publication of the Thaler and Sustein (2008) volume the concept of 
nudging has received widespread interest, reflected for example by Sunstein 
becoming an advisor on regulatory affairs for U.S. President Barack Obama, while 
Thaler has been an advisor for U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron’s Behavioural 
Insights Team, referred to as the ‘Nudge-unit’ (Behavioural Insights Team, n.d.) 
whose goal is to “persuade citizens to choose what is best for themselves and 
society” (Basham, 2010, p. 4).  Several years later, this team has doubled in size 
because of its success in nudging British consumers to pay taxes on time, insulate 
their attics, sign up for organ donation, stop smoking during pregnancy, and make 
charitable donations.  Likewise in the U.S., the Obama administration embraced 
nudges (Dorning, 2010) and has used them to increase enrollment in the President’s 
signature piece of legislation, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Maher, 2012).  In addition to political activities the use of nudging has gained 
momentum in a number of other disciplines (Saghai, 2013). 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) define a nudge as: “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.  To count as a 
nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid” (p. 6). Furthermore, it 
should be noted that although Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and many others use the 
term ‘nudging’ about assisting people make ‘positive’ choices, the term is not 
exclusively used in this manner (Saghai, 2013).  For example, John Balz, editor of 
The Nudge blog, indicated that “nudging takes place in [a] variety of realms where 
the nudger’s explicit goal is to promote [the nudger’s] own welfare (think of almost 
any consumer marketing strategy or retail store layout)” (Balz, 2013). 
Nudges gently steer individuals to make decisions by changing the way choices 
are presented and involves engineering people’s choices so as to channel them to 
make more  desirable decisions (from the perspective of the choice architect) 
without substantively limiting their choice.  Nudges are not legal or regulatory 
mandates.  Taxing “un-healthy” food at a higher rate than “healthier” food is a 
nudge; making “un-healthy food” illegal is not.  Thaler (2009) noted that “We’ve 
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been nudged forever.  Eve and the serpent nudged Adam.  Religions have been 
nudging us for thousands of years.  Marketers nudge us.  Ads are nudges.” 
Nudges often include a variety of soft touches and are passive/easy in that they 
require little effort.  They encourage people to make choices that are good for 
themselves or society by taking advantage of imperfections in human decision-
making abilities (French, 2011).  The idea of nudge is best grasped by reference to 
specific examples, rather than by formal definition. One frequently cited nudge 
example is the etching of the image of a housefly into the men’s room urinals at 
Amsterdam’s Schipol Airport which was intended to “improve the aim” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p. 4) of patrons resulting in reduced spillage by 80% (Goldstein, 
Johnson, Herrmann, & Heitmann, 2008).  
Other examples include arranging food in cafeterias so that healthy items are 
displayed prominently at eye level, with the fattier, sugar-laden options displayed 
further back in order to encourage customers to choose the healthy options (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008), changing 
plate sizes in cafeterias from 12-inch dinner plates to 10-inch dinner plates 
leading to reduced food consumption (Wansink, 2006), painting white stripes on 
road bends spaced more closely together at the most dangerous points to create the 
illusion that the vehicle’s speed is increasing thereby prompting drivers to brake 
before the apex of the curve (Selinger & Whyte, 2011), increasing honesty by having 
people sign self-declarations at the top, rather than the bottom of forms thereby 
making ethics more salient (Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012), and 
changing default options so that employees are automatically enrolled into 
retirement plans (Madrian & Shea, 2001).  
Nudges and Mental Shortcuts 
Central to the idea of nudges is that human reasoning comprises two underlying 
systems with one characterized as intuitive, reflexive, and automatic and the second 
described as logical, analytical, and reflective (Kahneman, 2011; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 
2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000).  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
characterize the automatic thinking system as “rapid and is or feels instinctive, and 
it does not involve what we usually associate with the word thinking” (p. 19).  
Examples of the automatic system in action include smiling upon seeing a puppy, 
becoming nervous by experiencing air turbulence, and ducking when a ball is 
coming toward a person.  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) characterize the reflective 
system as being deliberate and self-conscious.  Examples of the operations of this 
system include deciding which college to attend or where to go on vacation.  
Nudges aim at influencing behavior change through (primarily) automatic 
modes of thinking without engaging the reflective system (Haug & Busch, 2014). 
Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2012) have collated the 
nine most robust effects that influence behavior in mostly automatic—rather than 
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deliberate—ways and summarized them under the mnemonic, MINDSPACE 
(Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, Affect, Commitments, 
Ego).  Defaults are of particular importance in this paper.  
Such instinctive thinking is prejudiced heavily by mental shortcuts and 
heuristics (Kahneman, 2011).  Nudges “… work by making use of those flaws” 
(Hausman & Welch, 2010, p. 126) and in ways that do not make it likely to be 
recognized and transparent.  Research has identified a number of such biases 
including anchoring, availability, representativeness, loss aversion, and the status 
quo or inertia bias. 
More recently the status quo cognitive misstep has received increased 
attention.  It involves the propensity of decision makers to keep things the way they 
are (Anderson, 2003; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) often leading to choices that 
guarantee that things remain the same, or change as little as possible.  This 
judgmental error encourages people to stick with their current situation.  Because 
of this, people rarely move their bank accounts or pensions or cancel initially 
enticing magazine subscriptions.  
Remaining with the status quo can be rational.  There are costs to change, and 
existing states often have the advantage of history, of being well-understood, and of 
having popular support (Burke, 1790 ⁄ 1999).  Institutions, rules, customs, and 
habits may not be for the best, but changing them would be too costly in terms of 
time, money, and ⁄ or effort.  Still, there are a variety of non-rational, psychological 
processes that enhance the strength of status quo maintenance, and this preference 
in many cases is rightfully labeled a bias (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012).  
It appears that preserving the status quo is grounded in loss aversion and 
regret avoidance (Anderson, 2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).  People 
give more weight to losses than to equal gains (i.e., they are “loss averse;” Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1991, p. 1039).  Because the status quo operates as a reference point 
from which change is considered, the costs of change carry more weight than 
potential benefits, creating a relative advantage for the existing state of affairs 
(Moshinsky & Bar-Hillel, 2010).  Loss aversion also leads to greater regret for action 
than for inaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and more regret is experienced 
when a decision changes the status quo than when it maintains it (Hesketh, 1996).  
Together these forces provide an advantage for the present state of affairs; people 
are motivated to do nothing and to continue current or previous decisions 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) and change is avoided. 
Defaults 
The inertia bias is the underlying heuristic that makes defaults the quintessential 
nudge (Maylin, 2012).  A default is the designated course of action for those who fail 
to explicitly choose for themselves (Willis, 2012).  Default options are automatically 
chosen when individuals make no active choice and stay with the given state or 
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condition (Brown & Krishna, 2004) and are sometimes considered “hidden 
persuaders” (Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2009, p. 1) because people tend to 
remain with preset options.  
Defaults exert significant and pervasive influence as individuals regularly 
accept the default setting, even if it has significant consequences (Levav, Heitmann, 
Herrmann, & Iyengar, 2010).  Structuring the default option to maximize benefits 
for people and firms can influence behavior without restricting individual choice.  
For instance, compared to non-enrollment defaults, governments that presume 
citizens as willing subscribers have markedly higher organ donation rates (Abadie 
& Gay, 2006; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003); companies with automatic 401(k) 
enrollments have more employees who save for retirement (Madrian & Shea, 2001); 
cities with “green” electricity defaults have lower energy usage (Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008); and states with limited tort defaults have drivers who pay 
lower insurance premiums (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993).  
Default effects have also been observed in the use of advanced medical directives, 
Internet privacy preferences, legal contracts, medical vaccine adherence, and even 
for how psychologists choose to analyze their data (Bellman, Johnson, & Lohse, 
2001; Chapman, Li, Colby, & Yoon, 2010; Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & 
Strahan, 1999; Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002; Korobkin, 1998; Kressel, 
Chapman, & Leventhal, 2007; Young, Monin, & Owens, 2009). 
 Thus, defaults matter and their appeal is considered so strong that it has 
been referred to as the “iron law of default inertia” (Ayres, 2006, p. 5).  Defaults 
generally become effective through three principal mechanisms: (1) implied 
endorsement, where the default option may be perceived as a recommendation; (2) 
cognitive bias, where deviating from a default may be felt as a loss; and (3) inertia 
or “going with the flow,” where deviating from a default requires additional effort 
(Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2013).  
Defaults do not force anyone to do anything.  On the contrary, they maintain 
freedom of choice by allowing people to opt-out or opt-in as they see fit.  Defaults 
can be valuable and worth a fight.  For example, search engines like Google and 
MSN want their browser to be the default preloaded on computers and go to court to 
preserve such status so as to garner more of the roughly $20 billion search-
advertisement market (Kesan & Shah, 2006).  
Negative Option Marketing 
Marketers have exploited the power of defaults within a negative option marketing 
(NOM) framework where the consumer’s failure to reject or cancel an offer (i.e., to 
act) signals consent.  NOM, also referred to as advance consent marketing, 
automatic renewals, continuous-service agreements, unsolicited marketing,  
recurring billing, inertia selling, “free trial” offers, or “book-of-the-month” type 
plans, uses defaults to take advantage of the status quo and inaction to achieve 
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marketing objectives (Sunstein, 2013).  NOM requires that consumers take action in 
order to not purchase or renew the product or service (Licata & Von Bergen, 2007). 
NOM incorporates an opt-out default in which consent is presumed and where not 
explicitly making a choice, doing nothing, or being silent means agreement.  
Individuals must explicitly become involved and take steps to prevent the default 
from occurring and the sale or renewal from consummating (Lamont, 1995).  
As shown in Table 1, four types of plans generally fall within the NOM category 
(U.S. Federal Trade Commission, FTC, 2009): pre-notification negative option 
plans; continuity plans; automatic renewals; and free-to-pay or nominal fee-to-pay 
conversion plans.  First, in pre-notification plans, such as book, wine, or music 
clubs, sellers send periodic notices offering goods.  If consumers take no action, 
sellers send the goods and charge consumers.  Second, in continuity plans, 
consumers agree in advance to receive periodic shipments of goods or provision of 
services, which they continue to receive until they cancel the agreement.  Third, in 
automatic renewals a seller automatically renews a consumer’s purchase of a good 
or service and charges the person for it, unless the transaction is cancelled. It 
should be noted that with this type of plan, there may be a required notification 
period before the customer is no longer charged for the service, such as a ninety-day 
notice before a cancellation takes effect.  Finally, sellers also structure trial offers as 
free-to-pay or nominal-fee-to-pay conversion plans, such as receiving free premium 
cable channels for 60 days.  In these plans, consumers receive goods or services for 
free (or for a nominal fee) for a trial period.  After the trial period, sellers 
automatically charge a fee (or higher fee) unless consumers affirmatively cancel or 
return the goods or services.  
Given the fact that these plans involve a process whereby the consumer is billed 
at a later time without obtaining subsequent consent or payment information after 
the initial interaction, there is a heightened level of scrutiny surrounding the 
suitability and comprehensiveness of the disclosures required during the initial 
consumer/business operator sign-up event.  NOM has received unfavorable 
attention from the FTC, various state attorneys general, and other regulatory 
bodies.  Despite this, marketers and consumers alike have found this billing method 
to be a convenient and useful payment option over the years.  With proper and 
prominent disclosures, a reasonable price point, an equitable refund policy, and a 
responsive customer service department (complete with a user-friendly cancellation 
policy), there is no reason to think that such billing cannot be a suitable business 
model. 
Indeed, marketers may use defaults to encourage “virtuous” behavior, even if 
the subject would not normally explicitly choose to engage in that behavior.  An 
example of such a program is a “carbon off-set” scheme by Qantas Airlines which 
“encourages” their customers to make an environmentally friendly decision by an 
opt-out donation to an Australian government-approved organization that uses the 
funds to offset the passenger’s share of flight emissions by some form of carbon 
sequestration (Qantas Airlines, n.d.).  Customers who do not wish pay the extra fee 
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must explicitly opt-out of the purchase of the carbon off-set during the on-line 
transaction.  Thus, the Qantas NOM engineers people’s choices through defaults to 
make more socially desirable decisions without substantively limiting their choice. 
Table 1 
Examples of Negative Option Marketing 
Type of NOM Plan Characteristics of Plan Examples 
Pre-notification 
Seller sends periodic offers of 
goods. If the customer does not 
take action, the goods are sent 
to and charged to the 
customer. 
A music club sends a person an 
offer for a DVD and then later 
sends them the DVD if they do 
not first write the club and 
explain that they do not wish to 
purchase the DVD      
Continuity 
Customer agrees to receive 
periodic shipment of goods or 
provision of service until the 
customer cancels the contract 
An individual agrees in advance 
to receive shipments of facial 
crème every three months until 
they affirmatively call and cancel 
future shipments                                      
Automatic renewal 
Product or service is 
automatically renewed at the 
end of a specified period 
unless the customer cancels 
the renewal. 
A purchaser pays an annual 
subscription for a magazine, and 
the magazine automatically 
renews and charges them for an 
additional year subscription after 
their first year expires unless 
they first call and cancel the 
subscription 
Free-to-pay or 
Nominal-fee-to-pay 
conversion offers 
Customer receives a trial offer 
of a product/service at little or 
no cost. At the end of the trial 
period, customers are charged 
the regular price unless they 
cancel the service. 
A consumer signs up for a free 
trial membership to an online 
social networking website, and 
after the trial period, the site 
begins to charge them a fee 
unless they first cancel their 
membership 
 
 
NOM protocols can also be convenient by doing away with the need to revisit 
the purchase/payment process each month for a product or service that the 
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consumer plans to use for an extended period of time.  Many people are signed up in 
a negative option deal with their utility company, mortgage holder, phone company, 
cell phone provider, cable television provider, car loan company, or the like.  Every 
month bills come due, and every month sellers automatically charge the person’s 
credit card or debit their checking account.   
Negative option offers are not necessarily bad, if the merchant is 
trustworthy.  Likewise, if the details of the proposal are communicated adequately 
to customers, free-to-pay conversion programs provide consumers with the valuable 
opportunity to try products before committing to a purchase.  On their own, neither 
of these billing methods is suspect or unethical.  If properly implemented, negative 
option billing can provide value to both sides of the transaction. 
Responsible merchants will not generally be a problem but unscrupulous and 
unethical sellers using NOM protocols can create havoc for consumers.  Bell (2013) 
provides an example that involves the following sequence: 
1. The seller offers you a service online, such as premium membership on a 
website, or even Internet service, e-mail, etc. 
2. The merchant requires a credit card for negative option billing, telling you 
that you can ‘cancel at any time!’ 
3. You sign up for the service and use it for a while.  Eventually you decide you 
no longer want to use the service and try to cancel. 
4. You go to the merchant’s website to cancel and find that you are required to 
CALL to cancel.  Or, they have a link to cancel that does not work, or when 
you fill it out, they claim not to have received your submission. 
5. You call and try to cancel.  They send you to a ‘cancellation specialist’ who 
tries to convince you not to cancel the service—often browbeating you in the 
process.  They finally concede and say they will cancel your service. 
6. You get a bill next month for the service.  You call again, and they claim 
never to have    received notice of cancellation.  This can go on for months, 
even after you have sent them registered letters. 
7. In some instances the charges eventually stop, but only after months of 
excess charges, which are never refunded.  In some instances, the charges 
stop—but mysteriously re-start after a few months.  In other instances, the 
only way to get them to stop is to cancel your credit card and get a new one.   
 
Unprincipled marketers overcome consumer complaints by apologizing 
profusely and saying something to the effect of “Our computer broke down! Our 
phones are being upgraded and we have experienced some problems. We’re really 
very sorry!”  If the consumer initiates legal action, the vendor often claims that (a) 
they never received the earlier cancellation notices by phone, e-mail, or online; (b) 
their computers “went haywire”; or (c) innocent mistakes were made. 
Another NOM corollary that has come under increased scrutiny involves 
consumers who have been unwittingly charged monthly membership fees in various 
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buying clubs, shopping services, and discount programs that purport to offer 
savings on consumer goods, health and wellness products, and entertainment 
expenses.  Consumers report that they had never heard of and neither ordered nor 
wanted these products or services (Huffman, 2012) and only realized they were 
members of such organizations when they saw charges on their credit card or 
checking account statements.  The process generally works as follows: after first 
completing an Internet-based transaction using a credit card, a pop-up window 
appears on the consumer’s computer screen featuring a different product offered by 
a separate company, as well as an incentive to sign-up.  After the consumer enters 
his or her e-mail address only (not credit card information) in response to this 
second offer, the consumer’s credit card is billed for the underlying product offering 
because, unbeknownst to the consumer, his or her credit card information was 
provided (“passed off”) by the first company to the second business. 
In response to such shenanigans President Obama signed the Restore Online 
Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA) into law on December 29, 2010.  This law places 
restrictions and limits on after sale “data passes” and NOM practices through 
Internet sales.  The law prohibits an initial e-commerce vendor from passing-off a 
user’s credit card information to a third-party in a post-transaction sale for the 
purposes of that post-transaction third-party’s sale of goods or services to the user.  
In addition, the Act requires that the third party seller disclose to the consumer 
prior to obtaining their billing information: 
 a description of the goods and services; 
 that it is not affiliated with the initial merchant; 
 the costs of the goods or services. 
Before charging the consumer, the third party seller must receive the 
consumer’s express informed consent for the charge by obtaining from the 
purchaser: 
 the full account number to be charged; 
 the consumer’s name, address, and contact information; 
 “additional affirmative action” indicating a consumer’s consent to be 
charged (such as clicking on a confirmation button or checking a box). 
ROSCA also restricts marketers’ use of a negative option and requires that in 
order to use a negative option feature, the marketer must: 
 clearly and conspicuously disclose all material terms and conditions of the 
transaction prior to obtaining the consumer’s billing information; 
 obtain “express informed consent” from the customer before charging the 
financial account provided by the individual; 
 provide “simple mechanisms” for a consumer to cancel the recurring 
charges. 
Violations of the law are considered unfair and deceptive practices under the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act (1980) and enforcement actions may be brought 
by the FTC and state attorneys general. 
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Best Practices Guide 
Based on laws, guidelines, and scenarios indicated above the following best 
practices for successful and legally defensible NOM protocols are now presented.  
This synopsis, much of which was offered by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
and the Direct Marketing Association (2014), may be considered an alternative to 
mandatory legislated standards and will be a valuable resource for marketers, 
lawyers, information technology staff, and others interested in adopting effective 
NOM approaches. Table 2 summarizes these guidelines. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Key Negative Option Marketing Principles 
1. Disclose the Material Terms of the Offer in an Understandable Manner 
2. Be Clear, Conspicuous, Accurate, and Truthful 
3. Obtain Buyers’ Affirmative Consent  
4. Do Not Make It Excessively Difficult and Onerous for Aggrieved Consumers to 
Successfully Navigate the Cancellation Process 
 
  
1. Disclose the Material Terms of the Offer in an Understandable 
Manner.  The material terms of negative option offers should include: the 
existence of the offer; the price or the range of prices of the goods or services 
purchased by the consumer, including whether there are any additional 
charges; the transfer of a consumer’s billing information to a third party (if 
applicable); that the current plan or renewal prices of the goods or services 
are subject to change; the terms and conditions of any refund policy; how to 
cancel the offer; and the time period within which the consumer must cancel.   
Conversely, marketers ought to avoid making disclosures that are 
unnecessarily long, vague, complicated, or contain contradictory language.  
Many NOM programs rely on bewildering legalese to explain the material 
terms of their offers; however, the FTC requires sellers to explain what the 
customer will receive, how often they will receive it, how much it will cost, 
and how to cancel in plain English.  Additionally, marketers should inform 
consumers in the initial offer of the length of any trial period, including a 
statement that the consumer’s account will be charged after the trial period 
(including the date of the charge) unless the consumer takes an affirmative 
step to cancel, providing the consumer a reasonable time period to cancel, 
and the steps needed to avoid charges.  Other factors to be disclosed include 
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whether the consumer will be billed or automatically charged and any terms 
with regards to a “free to keep” incentive as applicable. 
2. Be Clear, Conspicuous, Accurate, and Truthful.  To make online 
negative option disclosures clear and conspicuous, marketers should place 
them in locations on web pages where they are likely to be seen, label the 
disclosures (and any links to them) to indicate the importance and relevance 
of the information, and use text that is easy to read on the screen and 
illustrate the key terms of an offer in a way that grabs the attention of the 
consumer.  It is absolutely vital that the price point of the vendor’s product or 
service, the applicable billing schedule, the cancellation method (complete 
with an 800 number for customer service) and the description of how the 
charges will appear on the consumer’s credit card statement are all clearly 
and conspicuously displayed directly above the “call to action” (usually the 
order “submit” button).   
Further, a link to the applicable Terms of Service and Privacy Policy 
must appear above the order “submit” button so that the consumer is made 
aware of the material terms prior to consummating the transaction.  
Additionally, marketers should provide reminders at the frequency specified 
in the initial offer.  Finally, organizations should be truthful in presenting 
their information and for Internet sales the initial merchant must never 
disclose a credit card, debit card, or other financial account number or other 
billing information that is used to charge the customer of the initial merchant 
to any post-transaction third party seller for use in an Internet-based sale of 
any goods or services from that post-transaction third party seller. 
3. Obtain Buyers’ Affirmative Consent.  Marketers should require that 
consumers take an affirmative step to demonstrate consent to a negative 
option offer before the customer is billed or charged.  Marketers should not 
rely on pre-checked boxes as evidence of consent and should leave an 
affirmation box on a website unchecked, or require buyers to go through a 
recorded verification script.  While it is important to ensure that the 
purchaser is made aware of the price prior to purchase, that is not the only 
price-related issue that a firm should be concerned with.  Regulators have 
also increasingly shown an interest in products and/or services that are 
marketed via negative option and/or free-to-pay conversion methods where 
the applicable price of the product and/or service bears little rational relation 
to the value of the actual product and/or service provided.  For example, a 
seller that is charging $60 a month on a recurring basis for access to a 
database of government auctions that is made available for free to the public 
is asking for trouble. 
4. Do Not Make It Excessively Difficult and Onerous for Aggrieved 
Consumers to Successfully Navigate the Cancellation Process.  
Organizations should ensure that the identity of the marketer, contact 
information for service, and a simple system for handling cancellations is 
presented.  Marketers should promptly honor requests for refunds due upon 
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consumers’ cancellation of the plan.  By doing so, they protect their 
businesses from violations and fines, but may also establish some customer 
goodwill and, might be able to convince them to stay.   
When nudging by default is used, it should be fairly easy for people to 
opt-out of the default option (Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012) and 
designers may need to take vulnerable populations (e.g., those with limited 
cognitive ability) into account.  Furthermore, firms must ensure that their 
customer service department is easy to access and responsive.  It does not 
hurt to have a liberal refund policy either.  The more responsive and 
accommodating the firm is, the more likely it is that the consumer will feel 
respected and made whole.  Healthy customer relations remain the 
cornerstone of any successful business, regardless of whether it employs 
negative option billing mechanisms as part of its marketing strategy. 
 
Summary 
Dual process theories of thinking propose that reasoning comprises two underlying 
systems and numerous investigations characterize human judgment and decision 
making as an interplay between intuitive-heuristic and demanding-analytic 
reasoning processes.  Decision-making heuristics are mental shortcuts that are used 
by individuals in making decisions and judgments are often unreflective, some even 
unconscious, yet they are widespread in human decision-making and greatly impact 
automatic thinking.  Nudges take advantage of individuals’ heuristics, their 
intuitions, their rules of thumb, their impulses, their myopia, and their laziness.  
Further, they guide and subtly direct people toward certain outcomes without 
substantively limiting their choice.  Nudges can appear very small and 
straightforward, yet, played out on a big scale, they can become significant. 
The classic example of a nudge is the default option which is simply what 
happens if persons do nothing.  Defaults, powered by the status quo bias, refer to 
the human tendency not to change an established behavior unless the incentive to 
change is compelling.  This phenomenon has been readily exploited by commercial 
service providers, particularly providers of energy, insurance services, 
telecommunications, or various membership clubs that make use of the tendency of 
subscribers to remain with their existing suppliers after the conclusion of the 
service contract, even though considerably less expensive substitutes may be readily 
available.  
Defaults are considered nudges because they exert a substantial influence on 
choice without restricting decision makers’ freedom to choose and are extremely 
potent and often inevitable (Liebig & Rommel, 2014).  Many people just go with the 
flow and agree to whatever the default is. It is this behavioral tendency to do 
nothing which makes the default option ubiquitous and compelling to marketers 
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employing NOM approaches.  Hence, careful attention to default options is 
important because a large number of people can be expected to end up with it.   
Firms regularly employ defaults to achieve desired outcomes.  Well-designed 
product or service defaults benefit both companies and consumers by simplifying 
decision making, enhancing customer satisfaction, reducing risk, and driving 
profitable purchases.  Not all defaults only benefit firms; many benefit consumers at 
the same time.  Products often are sold with maximally safe settings as the default, 
shielding consumers from physical injury and manufacturers from injury to 
reputation and product-defect liability (see Restatement [Third] of Torts § 2, 
comment a, 1998).  But some business-set defaults provide benefits to firms and 
potential costs to consumers.  Auto-renewal of subscriptions, insurance 
automatically sold with car rentals, default mailing list sign-ups, and pre-checked 
“options” added to online purchases are all common examples (Willis, 2012). Ill-
conceived defaults or, simply, defaults no one thought much about can leave money 
on the table, fuel consumer backlashes, put customers at risk, and trigger 
lawsuits—costing firms dearly (Goldstein et al., 2008). 
Defaults incorporated in NOM methods can significantly influence consumer 
behavior and this has attracted, regrettably, a number of unsavory promoters that 
have given this marketing scheme an unprincipled reputation.  Some state 
governments have attempted to ban negative-option programs as a deceptive 
marketing practice that tricks consumers into a cycle of recurring payments for 
products or services they do not want but only Hawaii has actually done so.  It is 
hoped that the guidelines presented in this paper can assist firms to properly and 
ethically implement their NOM offers and not have more legislative initiatives ban 
the practice resulting in a sizable loss of revenue.  As the astute reader realizes, this 
last comment is a nudge based on the loss aversion heuristic which refers to people’s 
tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984).  
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